Insuring the uninsurable : brokers and incomplete insurance contracts

How do markets spread risk when events are unknown or unknowable and where not anticipated in an insurance contract? While the policyholder can "hold up" the insurer for extra contractual payments, the continuing gains from trade on a single contract are often too small to yield useful coverage. By acting as a repository of the reputations of the parties, we show the brokers provide a coordinating mechanism to leverage the collective hold up power of policyholders. This extends both the degree of implicit and explicit coverage. The role is reflected in the terms of broker engagement, specifically in the ownership by the broker of the renewal rights. Finally, we argue that brokers can be motivated to play this role when they receive commissions that are contingent on insurer profits. This last feature questions a recent, well publicized, attack on broker compensation by New York attorney general, Elliot Spitzer. Klassifikation: G22, G24, L1

Parallelizable sparse inverse formulation Gaussian processes (SpInGP)

We propose a parallelizable sparse inverse formulation Gaussian process (SpInGP) for temporal models. It uses a sparse precision GP formulation and sparse matrix routines to speed up the computations. Due to the state-space formulation used in the algorithm, the time complexity of the basic SpInGP is linear, and because all the computations are parallelizable, the parallel form of the algorithm is sublinear in the number of data points. We provide example algorithms to implement the sparse matrix routines and experimentally test the method using both simulated and real data.Comment: Presented at Machine Learning in Signal Processing (MLSP2017

Insuring the Uninsurable: Brokers and Incomplete Insurance Contracts

How do markets spread risk when events are unknown or unknowable and where not anticipated in an insurance contract? While the policyholder can "hold up" the insurer for extra contractual payments, the continuing gains from trade on a single contract are often too small to yield useful coverage. By acting as a repository of the reputations of the parties, we show the brokers provide a coordinating mechanism to leverage the collective hold up power of policyholders. This extends both the degree of implicit and explicit coverage. The role is reflected in the terms of broker engagement, specifically in the ownership by the broker of the renewal rights. Finally, we argue that brokers can be motivated to play this role when they receive commissions that are contingent on insurer profits. This last feature questions a recent, well publicized, attack on broker compensation by New York attorney general, Elliot Spitzer.Incomplete Insurance Contracts, Brokerage, Contingent Commissions, Reputation

Fast decision problems in E+E- collisions at high energy

Imperial Users onl